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Abstract 
Property tax appeals have increased dramatically at significant cost to local governments.  Little 
is known about whether or how well the appeals process resolves potential assessment errors.  
This paper investigates the efficiency and equity of this process.  Regarding the efficiency of 
correcting assessment error, reductions are granted for a majority of appealing homeowners who 
are overassessed but also for homeowners who are not overassessed, leaving them underassessed 
or further underassessed.  Regarding the fairness of the appeals process, homeowners from 
particular neighborhoods receive assessment reductions more often.  Tax representatives play an 
important role in explaining the advantage enjoyed by these homeowners. 
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he property tax appeals process gives owners two different chances—with an informal 
and a formal avenue—to question their property assessments by meeting with either the 
property tax assessor or questioning the assessed value with a local value adjustment 
board.  While nationwide data on appeals are not readily available, there are numerous 
newspaper articles providing anecdotal evidence that the number of appeals have skyrocketed in 
selected areas throughout the United States (for examples, see Perry 2007, Healy 2009, 
Olorunnipa 2010, and Neumann and Chaudhuri 2011).  These articles point to several events to 
explain the escalation of property tax appeals.  One factor has been the large swings in housing 
prices that have occurred over the past decade.  The housing price run-ups throughout the 
country in the early 2000s caused many owners to appeal their property taxes on the basis that 
their assessed values were rising too rapidly.  During the subsequent bust in local housing 
markets, owners appealed because they felt their assessments were not falling rapidly enough.  
Another factor apparently contributing to the growth in appeals has been the emergence of a 
“cottage industry of tax representatives” who offer to handle the appeals at no expense to the 
selected property owners (as reported by Nakamura and Stewart 2009, Kestin and Maines 2010, 
Tugend 2010, and Stangenes 2012).  Instead, the tax representatives work on a contingency fee 
basis, asking for as much as half of the first year’s tax savings brought about by a successful 
appeal.  These representatives are typically unregulated by state and local governments, which 
helps explain the dearth of knowledge surrounding their operations.  Media reports suggest that 
representatives target affluent neighborhoods in making their solicitations, where the potential 
tax savings of winning an appeal are the greatest.  A recent statewide audit questioned other 
aspects of the appeals process, like the impartiality of local officials, the qualifications of 
decision-making magistrates, and deviations from procedures and rules (Christensen 2014, State 
of Florida Auditor General 2014). An empirical approach can explore such issues and determine 
whether property tax reductions are warranted or should be granted from a statistical standpoint. 
The cost of appeals is far from trivial; hence, the appeals process should, at the least, 
result in smaller assessment errors.  Smaller assessment errors result in a more efficient ad 
valorem tax.  Regarding the fairness of the process, reductions in assessed values garnered from 
filing appeals should not favor one group over another, after controlling for the pre-appeal 
assessed-to-market value ratio.  Ideally, the appeals process would be characterized by two 
T 
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attributes: 1) appeals-related reductions would depend only on whether a homeowner’s 
assessment exceeds the statutory limit and 2) all homeowners would have equal opportunity to 
participate in the process. 
In this paper, we document two important empirical findings: 1) appeals-related 
reductions in assessed values do not always result in an assessment that falls in what might be 
considered a “correct” range, and 2) after controlling for assessment error, the probability of 
receiving a reduction in assessed value is highest among homeowners living in majority white 
neighborhoods.  Both of these findings suggest that there may be shortcomings associated with 
the appeals process.  The rest of the paper establishes a framework for analyzing the appeals 
process and shows how these findings are obtained empirically.  Special attention is given to tax 
representatives and whether they create (or alleviate) assessment errors.  Our analysis is based on 
an exceedingly rich database of roughly 50,000 property tax appeals filed by single-family 
homeowners in Miami-Dade County, Florida, over a five-year period. To provide some context 
around the empirical approach, we begin by reviewing the related literature. 
 
Literature Review 
The papers that investigate the property tax appeals process are all quite recent. Weber and 
McMillen (2010) use Chicago data to estimate the probability of appeal and the probability of 
winning an appeal. Their primary interest is in how these probabilities are affected by thin 
markets. However, the results also shed some light on the equity of the appeals process by 
finding appeals are more likely from homeowners living in higher priced neighborhoods, which 
suggests that appeals may aggravate regressivity. In a more thorough investigation of the latter 
possibility, McMillen (2013) uses the same Chicago data to study the distribution of assessment 
ratios before and after appeals had been decided. The paper finds that appeals reduce the spread 
of assessment error, but the highest priced homes tend to receive the largest assessment 
reductions, again suggesting that the appeals process may aggravate regressivity. Using data 
from Harris County, Texas, Plummer’s (2011, 2014) investigation primarily focuses on the effect 
that the land value ratio (assessed land value/total assessed market value) has on the probability 
of filing an appeal and determines the appeals process can improve assessment uniformity. A 
related study by Hissong and Hawley (2012) shows that higher market values increase the 
probability of appeal and the likelihood of filing a formal in comparison to an informal appeal in 
Tarrant County, Texas.  While these papers offer insights on the equity and efficiency of the 
appeals process, they only provide limited policy direction since they do not untangle where 
problems arise within the process. This serves as the point of departure of the present study. 
 
Overview of the Property Tax Appeals Process 
The property tax appeals process typically consists of two distinct types of appeal, henceforth 
labeled informal and formal.  The two appeal types are largely the same across the United States, 
where property owners always have the right to appeal.  After homeowners receive their tax bill, 
they have the right to request an in-person conference with their county tax assessor or his/her 
representative.  In these conferences, after the tax assessor furnishes evidence on how the 
assessment was reached, homeowners have the opportunity to challenge their assessed values, 
and assessments can be lowered by the tax assessor.  These conferences are what we refer to as 
“informal appeals.”  Independent of the right to confer, every homeowner has several weeks (the 
modal period across states is 30 days) after receiving his tax bill to file a grievance with his 
county Value Adjustment Board (VAB) for an assessment reduction.  We call these petitions 
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“formal appeals.”  The petitioning homeowner is granted a hearing, during which the 
homeowner (or his representative) and the tax assessor present evidence favorable to their 
positions.  A magistrate, under the auspices of the VAB, decides whether or not to grant the 
homeowner’s appeal and lower the assessed value.  There is also an option to appeal the VAB 
decision in Circuit or Appellate Court, but this right is seldom exercised so we focus here on the 
informal and formal processes.  The appeals process can be expressed in probabilistic terms as: 
 
𝑃(𝑅) = 𝑃(𝐼) + 𝑃(𝐹) = 𝑃(𝐶) ∗ 𝑃(𝐼|𝐶) + 𝑃(𝐴) ∗ 𝑃(𝐹|𝐴) (1) 
In words, the probability of successfully obtaining an assessment reduction, denoted as 
P(R), is equal to the sum of the probability of a successful informal reduction, P(I), and the 
probability of a successful formal reduction, P(F). The equation is written as two mutually 
exclusive events because our regressions do not include a single appellant who files a formal 
reduction after receiving an informal reduction.  The probability of an informal reduction is 
equal to the probability of requesting a conference times the probability of obtaining a reduction 
at the conference (conditional on requesting one), or P(C)∙P(I|C).  The probability of a formal 
reduction is equal to the probability of filing a petition times the probability of winning the 
appeal (given a petition has been filed), or P(A)∙P(F|A). 
Our data enable us to estimate P(I), P(A), and P(F|A), which will be useful in 
determining where inefficiencies and inequities arise within the appeals process.  However, no 
data are available on homeowners who request a conference yet fail to get a reduction, 
precluding the estimation of P(C). 
 
Description of Data 
We draw from three databases to conduct our investigation of the appeals process in Miami-
Dade County, Florida and the role that tax representatives play in this process: 1) a sales file 
containing all single-family property sales within the county from 1995 to 2009, 2) the county’s 
preliminary and final property tax roll for each year for which we have appeals data, and 3) all 
formal appeals registered within the county for the years 2005 to 2009. 
The sales file is collected by the Florida Department of Revenue (FDOR) and includes 
the prices of all single-family properties sold in arms-length transactions.  The 2010 tax roll 
includes, for the first time, a block group number for each parcel.  Because both the sales file and 
tax rolls have common parcel identification numbers, the 2000 Census block group of each 
parcel is taken from the 2010 roll and assigned to the parcels within the sales file.  This enables 
us to add 2000 Census data describing the income level and racial composition of each parcel’s 
neighborhood.  Along with these neighborhood variables, each sales file record includes the 
property’s sales price, year built, lot size, and total living area. 
The preliminary and final tax property tax rolls provide a basis to uncover informal 
appeals.  The property records on these rolls contain the same neighborhood and structural 
descriptors as found within the aforementioned sales file.  The key variable from these rolls is 
the assessed value of the property, which in Florida is supposed to represent the market value of 
the property on January 1 of the tax roll year.  Another crucial detail is that property 
reassessments are done on an annual basis.  Annual revaluations happen in 20 U.S. states and 
another 22 states do them at least every five years (Significant Features of the Property Tax).  
Preliminary tax rolls, with these reassessments, must be submitted to the FDOR on July 1, while 
the final tax rolls are due on November 1.  County tax assessors mail preliminary property tax 
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bills to homeowners in August.  Homeowners have the right to a face-to-face conference with 
their assessor or his/her representative.  Phone interviews indicate these informal meetings are 
most often a time when the homeowner raises objections while the assessor explains the 
evaluation methods and shows supporting data but does not perform additional analysis.  If the 
conference results in a reduction in assessed value, the assessed value reported on the final roll 
will be less than what is listed on the preliminary roll.  Thus, by comparing the assessed values 
reported on the preliminary and final tax rolls within a single year, we can observe reductions in 
assessed values coming from informal conferences. 
Data on formal appeal hearings come from the Miami-Dade County Valuation 
Adjustment Board.  The data span all appeals filed over the years 2005–2009.  For each appeal, 
the following information is reported: the parcel identification number (which enables us to 
locate the property with GIS mapping software), whether the appeal is granted, and the tax 
representative’s name, if applicable. The file includes 104 different tax representatives who are 
used by single-family homeowners over the five years.  To determine whether an agent has a 
professional license, we rely on two other public databases.  First, the Florida Bar membership 
directory allows us to search for licensed attorneys.  Second, data from the Florida Department 
of Business and Professional Regulation provide a way to match the remaining agents to state-
issued licenses.  From both sources, we determine that 34 agents are lawyers and 58 agents have 
other licenses (e.g., a realtor, private appraiser, or a certified public accountant) related to real 
estate matters and, for ease, we refer to all non-lawyer agents as realtors. The industry has a 
small group of active tax representatives—five of them have handled over 1,000 appeals each.  
 
<--- Insert Table 1 about here ---> 
 
Table 1 summarizes the assessed value appeals data (we do not consider legal appeals in 
this paper).  There has been a substantial increase in the number of appeals filed by single-family 
homeowners over time.  Over the five-year period, informal reductions increase from 369 to 
6,313 (a 1611 percent increase), while formal appeals grow from 3,640 in 2005 to 14,441 in 
2009 (a 297 percent rise).  The underlying single-family housing stock has expanded more 
slowly from 306,594 in 2005 to 366,196 in 2009 (the 19 percent increase is mainly driven by the 
FDOR reclassifying cluster homes from condominia to single-family and not new construction), 
which means the total number of appeals have gone from 1.3 percent  to 5.7 percent of single-
family homes.  Other noteworthy trends in the table are the rise in the percentage of formal 
appeals won by homeowners and the decline in the percentage of petitioners using a lawyer tax 
representative to file their appeal. The latter occurs despite the fact that appeals using a lawyer 
record a much higher chance of obtaining a reduction in assessed value (71 percent success rate 
for lawyers, 61 percent for realtors, and 26 percent if the homeowner has no representative). 
 
 <--- Insert Table 2 about here --->  
 
In order to investigate the fairness of assessed value reductions that come from appeals 
we construct a neighborhood typology based upon the median income and racial composition of 
each block group (there are typically 3–4 block groups in each Census tract).  Block groups are 
defined as high and low income based upon whether their median income is above or below the 
mean median income of all block groups ($43,655).  The racial categorization consists of 
majority black, majority Hispanic, majority white, or racially mixed (in other words, no group 
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holds a majority) population.  Combinations of the two income and four racial groups yield eight 
types of neighborhoods.  These neighborhood types are described in Table 2.  The table shows 
that the characteristics of white neighborhoods, both high and low income, are much different 
than those of the other neighborhood groups; in particular, median housing values are much 
higher in the white than in the nonwhite neighborhoods. Note that housing values are high in 
“low income, majority white” neighborhoods because these neighborhoods contain high 
percentages of retirees with significant housing wealth but relatively low current incomes.  In 
addition, homeowners living in high income, white neighborhoods comprise larger shares of the 
homeowners receiving informal reductions in their assessed values and filing formal appeals than 
their share of all homeowners on the tax roll.  This suggests that they are more likely to obtain an 
informal reduction and to file a formal appeal.  As the table’s final column shows, these 
homeowners receive, by a considerable margin, the largest median reduction in assessed value 
from winning a formal appeal. 
 
<--- Insert Table 3 about here ---> 
 
The final descriptive tables (Tables 3 and 4) show the utilization of tax representatives by 
type of neighborhood.  Tax representatives fall into two categories—those who are attorneys and 
those who are realtors.  For each neighborhood type, Table 3 reports the percentage of formal 
appeals filed using either type of representative, the percentage filed using a lawyer, and the 
percentage filed using a realtor.  Homeowners appealing from “high income, majority white” 
neighborhoods use tax representatives most often (78 percent).  This higher utilization is due to 
these homeowners relying much more on lawyers to file their appeals (44 percent of the time) in 
comparison to homeowners from other neighborhoods (who use lawyers roughly 33 percent of 
the time).  The utilization of realtors is very similar across the neighborhood types, with about 30 
to 35 percent of homeowners using this type of representative to file their appeal.  Also shown in 
Table 3 is the decreasing tendency of homeowners from all types of neighborhoods to rely on 
representatives to file their appeals.  For example, in 2005, a tax representative is used in 92 
percent of the appeals filed by homeowners living in “low income, majority white” 
neighborhoods.  This percentage declines monotonically, reaching a low of 63 percent by 2009.  
Homeowners appear to be gaining confidence in their own ability to file formal appeals without 
the assistance of a representative; this is not a complete surprise given a rise in newspaper 
articles, videos, and other information to guide property owners through the appeals process. 
 
<--- Insert Table 4 about here ---> 
 
To investigate the hypothesis that tax representatives target higher-priced neighborhoods, 
information is needed on where they make their solicitations.  While this information is not 
publicly available, we do know how many single-family homeowners within each neighborhood 
file an appeal using a tax representative.  As shown in Table 4, in any given year, about four 
percent of the homeowners in majority white neighborhoods petition with a representative.  The 
percentage is less than two percent in all of the other neighborhood groups.  These percentages 
are consistent with the idea that representatives may target neighborhoods with higher home 
values because the highest median home values are present in “low income, majority white” and 
the “high income, majority white” neighborhood groups. Successful appeals in these 
neighborhoods would provide the largest contingency fees (see final column of Table 2).  
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However, it is also possible that these homeowners are more likely to decide on their own, 
regardless of any solicitation, to file an appeal using a tax representative. 
 
 
Predictions of Market Value 
In Florida, all properties are required by statute to be assessed every year at their market value as 
of January 1.  To be precise, the assessed value is defined as 85 percent of market value to 
account for transfer costs involved with the property transaction. We rescale by dividing the 
recorded assessed value by 0.85 so that a perfectly correct AV equals the MV.  According to the 
FDOR, there is assessment error if the ratio of assessed to market value (AV/MV) deviates from 
unity.  In order to measure assessment error, the true market value of the property is needed.  We 
mark-to-market the price that the property is sold for within the next 24 months following the 
month of assessment by correcting for general inflation/deflation in monthly housing values 
(using the Case-Shiller monthly house price index for Miami-Dade).  A number of issues arise 
when using post-assessment sales to obtain market values.  First, not all properties are sold at 
market value.  There are short and other foreclosure-related sales as well as sales that are not 
arms-length.  In our data, these sales are identified by the FDOR as “disqualified” and they are 
excluded from the post-assessment sales sample.  Second, between the time when a property is 
assessed and when it is sold, a property could undergo a physical transformation that would 
affect its market value.  To guard against this change, we eliminated properties with a recorded 
change in the square footage of the lot or the interior living space.  Finally, only about 7 percent 
of the properties on the tax roll in any given year are sold in the post-assessment sales period; 
hence, there is the potential for sample selection bias.  Therefore, we test and correct for any bias 
in the estimated models as described below. 
To check the robustness of our findings, we reduce the post-assessment sales period 
down from 24 months to alternatively 12, 6, and 3 months.  This is done for two reasons.  First, 
restricting the post-assessment sales period reduces further the possibility that something 
changes about the property that may affect the market value.  Second, if the metropolitan 
housing market is segmented into submarkets, inflation/deflation in monthly housing values may 
vary across submarkets, introducing measurement error into our estimate of market value.  Any 
characteristic affecting housing values may segment a housing market.  For example, there may 
be “new” and “existing” home submarkets, “two bedroom” and “three bedroom” submarkets, or 
submarkets defined by the racial/ethnic mix of the neighborhood within which the home is 
located.  Unfortunately, market segmentation is highly controversial and the issue remains 
unresolved within the hedonic price literature. While one side claims there is sufficient mobility 
to reduce arbitrage (Linneman 1982) and another side points out how barriers are more prone to 
occur in the short-run and in submarkets (Watkins 2001), the entire debate is sometimes 
dismissed because of the difficulties with determining whether markets are segmented using 
statistical tests (Palmquist 2005).  If market segmentation is having an important effect on our 
estimates of market value, this may cause us to mis-categorize a home’s pre- versus post-appeal 
assessment status, causing us to reach erroneous conclusions regarding the ability of appeals to 
rectify assessment errors.  In addition, our regression models all include a variable registering 
whether (or to what extent) a home is overassessed prior to appeal.  This variable is based on our 
estimate of market value; hence, it will be measured with error if our market value estimate is 
inaccurate.  If this measured error is correlated with one or more of the other explanatory 
variables, this may cause us to reach the wrong conclusions regarding the fairness of the appeals 
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process. Fortunately, using the above alternative post-assessment sales periods provides a 
reliable check on whether market segmentation has affected our findings. As the period is 
lengthened, any differential price appreciation that may result from market segmentation would 
have more time to impact our results. Hence, if the results are stable across alternative periods, 
this would suggest that the possible importance of market segmentation can be largely 
discounted.  The 24 and 12 month samples yield highly similar results.  Reducing the sample 
below 12 months substantially shrinks the number of observations, but nevertheless is still 
suggestive that market segmentation has not biased our results.  In addition to the post-
assessment sampling approaches, we estimate the market value of the property on the date of 
assessment via a hedonic model that combines a Fourier expansion with characteristics of the 
property’s structure, location, neighborhood type, and block group (as done in Ihlanfeldt 2004, 
Burge and Ihlanfeldt 2005).  We utilize it to expand the sample to all appeals and the results are 
in agreement between the hedonic and post-assessment sales sample approaches.  Because of the 
complementary results and their voluminous nature, we report only the results obtained from our 
primary approach using the post-assessment sales sample over 24 months. 
 
Results Suggestive of Defects in the Appeals Process 
Two preliminary findings motivate our in-depth analysis of the appeals process: 1) the vast 
majority of appeals-related reductions in assessed value fall outside the range for “correct” 
assessments, and 2) after controlling for assessment error, appeals-related reductions in assessed 
values are not randomly distributed across neighborhood types but rather are more likely in 
majority white neighborhoods.  In this section, we document these findings and thoroughly 
investigate their causes in subsequent sections. 
 
<--- Insert Table 5 about here ---> 
 
We begin by comparing assessed-to-market value ratios before and after a reduction in 
assessed value (using all appeals, both informal and formal).  Mean ratios are reported in the first 
two rows of Table 5 for all years, for 2005–2007, and for 2008–2009.  The data are broken down 
into the latter two time periods because the housing bubble burst in 2007 in Florida, which may 
have affected the accuracy of appeals-related reductions in assessed values.  In the remaining 
rows of the table, properties are also categorized into six groups based on the assessment status 
they had before and after receiving a reduction in assessed value from the appeal, where the 
assessment status is defined as either “low” (AV/MV<0.95), “correct” (0.95≤AV/MV≤1.05), or 
“high” (AV/MV>1.05).  These “correct” categorizations are not entirely ad hoc. In a survey by 
the International Association of Assessing Officers (2008), 33 U.S. states (66 percent) report that 
appraisals must fall within a certain standard around the statutory level.  An interval of 0.90 to 
1.10 is used by 23 states and 7 states choose even tighter bands, like the 0.95 to 1.05 band we 
define as a “correct” assessment.  While Florida has no official written requirement, state 
regulators appear to question appraisals outside the 0.90 to 1.10 band and prefer values within 
0.95 to 1.05. For completeness, frequencies are listed with percentages in parentheses for both 
ranges in Table 5.  Since a broader “correct” assessment band fails to alter any of the overall 
conclusions, the text and further analyses focus on the narrower range. 
Looking at the first column (all years) in Table 5, the mean AV/MV ratio is 1.24 before 
reduction and 1.06 after reduction, which suggests that appeals are successful in moving 
assessments closer to their statutory mark.  However, in the middle panel, the results for the 
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before and after AV/MV groups show that only 18 percent of the homeowners receiving a 
reduction in AV end up with a correct assessment.  Homeowners tend to fall into two groups: 
“high before and high after” (40 percent of total) and “low before, low after” (24 percent of 
total).  The size of the latter group may be of particular concern, because while the former group 
warrants a reduction, the latter group does not.  The breakdown before and after the bust shows 
that “low before, low after” reductions are an especially large percentage of the total before the 
bust (41 percent), while the “high before, high after” reductions are an especially large 
percentage after the bust (48 percent). 
Part of the explanation for these differences between the boom and bust periods is that, in 
general, AV/MV ratios are lower (higher) when prices are trending upward (downward).  
Although Florida annually reassesses all properties, January 1 AVs are based on comparable sales 
that occurred throughout the previous year.  While this timing problem may account for high 
percentages of “low before” during the boom and “high before” after the bust, it does not explain 
why a higher percentage of the “low before” group received AV reductions during the boom or 
why a high percentage of the “high before” group failed to receive the full reduction in AV they 
were entitled to.  Here the explanations may revolve around cyclical changes in property taxation 
or deliberate moves by local officials whose budgets are connected to tax revenues (such 
concerns are consistent with a recent report by the State of Florida Auditor General 2014).  
During the boom, local governments in Florida had been flush with property tax revenues 
(Doerner and Ihlanfeldt 2011).  Assessors and magistrates may have felt little pressure from city 
and county politicians to keep assessment levels at their statutory maximum.  Thus, homeowners 
may have faced less opposition in their appeal for an AV reduction.  The bust, however, 
weakened the fiscal situation of many local governments (Ihlanfeldt 2012). In this new 
environment, assessors and magistrates may have felt powerful pressure to maintain the tax base, 
which would explain the tendency to reduce the AV of overassessed homeowners by less than the 
full amount warranted. 
 
<--- Insert Table 6 about here ---> 
 
To investigate the distribution of appeals-related reductions in AV across the 
neighborhood types, we estimate probit models where the dependent variable registers whether 
an informal or formal appeal lowered assessed value (shown in Table 6).  The observations 
consist of all single-family properties appended over the five tax roll years.  The set of 
explanatory variables includes the set of dummy variables identifying neighborhood type, where 
“high income, majority white” serves as the reference group and a measure of overassessment.  
In the first column, overassessment is measured as a dummy variable, indicating whether AV 
exceeds MV.  In the second column, overassessment is measured as AV/MV if AV>MV, 
otherwise AV/MV=1.  This provides a measure of the degree of overassessment. 
Regardless of how overassessment is measured, in comparison to the reference group, 
homeowners in all other neighborhood groups have a lower probability of receiving a reduction 
in assessed value.  Because the estimated models include measures of overassessment, the results 
suggest that appeals-related reductions in assessed values favor homeowners from “high income, 
majority white” neighborhoods.  Because the latter neighborhoods have the highest value homes 
(as reported in Table 2), these results imply that the appeals process contributes to the 
regressivity of the property tax.  Below, we further explore the source of the advantage enjoyed 
by homeowners from “high income, majority white” neighborhoods. 
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Basic Incentives of the Participants in the Appeals Process 
To aid in the interpretation of the results we obtain in our further investigation of the property tax 
appeals process, it is useful to briefly describe the incentives of each of the four groups 
participating in the appeals process—specifically, homeowners, tax representatives, assessors, 
and magistrates.  As with all models, the available data limit what can be modeled. The 
descriptions below may appear simplistic (they are not meant to capture all aspects of reality) but 
they help connect motivations in the appeals process with tradeoffs expressed in Equation (1). 
 
 Homeowners 
A homeowner appeals if the expected net benefit from appealing is positive (i.e., he/she saves 
money from the outcome of the appeals process).  The expected net benefit from filing an appeal 
equals the expected probability of winning the appeal times the expected savings minus the cost 
of filing the appeal.  The expected probability of winning is a positive function of the 
homeowner’s perceived degree of overassessment and whether a tax representative is used. 
In Florida, the expected savings from winning an appeal are affected by an idiosyncrasy 
of its property tax system—namely, a cap on increases in taxable value (TV) that resulted from 
the passage of the Save Our Homes (SOH) Act in 1992.  This law limits the growth of a 
homesteaded property’s TV to 3 percent per year or the rate of inflation, whichever is lower.  For 
homesteads who are recent movers and non-homesteads, AV and TV are the same.  For 
homesteads that have recently moved, AV and TV may no longer be equal after the first year of 
tenure depending on the inflation rate.  If AV increases by more than the cap limit, then AV rises 
faster than TV and a wedge develops between the two values.  As long as AV increases at a rate 
greater than the cap and the homesteaded owner remains in the house, the wedge between TV 
and AV continues to grow year after year.  Controlling for this wedge may be important when 
estimating the probability of obtaining an AV reduction because the wedge weakens the incentive 
to appeal.  A large enough wedge can render a reduction moot because a homeowner’s property 
tax bill will not change if the reduced AV still lies above TV. Although the Florida system may 
seem unique, many states (all but four) have implemented some kind of property tax cap by 
either rate (36 states), levy (31 states), or limit (17 states).  Tax wedges could arise elsewhere.  
The cost of filing an appeal depends on whether a tax representative is used.  Using a tax 
representative lowers the owner’s time cost in preparing the appeal.  The search cost in finding a 
representative is lower if the owner is solicited by the representative (rather than vice versa).  
The owner’s perceived cost of payment to the representative may depend on whether the fee is 
paid up front or on a contingency basis.  Owners will likely prefer contingency fees because the 
risk of having an appeal rejected is borne entirely by the tax representative. 
 
Tax Representatives 
In our model, a tax representative tries to maximize profit earned from filing appeals and 
representing homeowners in the appeals process.  Given a limited time constraint, the 
representative would target appeals that yield the largest tax savings (and therefore the largest 
contingency fees).  Expected tax savings equal the expected probability of winning the appeal 
times the perceived absolute difference between AV and MV.  If the degree of overassessment in 
percentage terms varies less than in absolute terms across neighborhoods, representatives will 
first solicit homes in higher valued neighborhoods.  This would explain the anecdotal evidence in 
recent newspaper articles that representatives only solicit within affluent neighborhoods. Another 
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explanation is that affluent neighborhoods have customized houses that provide a greater 
opportunity for inaccurate valuations if mass appraisal tools are used. Tax representatives could 
be poised to take advantage of potential appeals based on real estate market peculiarities. 
 
Tax Assessors 
The role of the tax assessor is to assess a homeowner’s property at its market value.  However, 
the statutory duty and other incentives may not always align.  Political motivations could lead to 
underassessment, especially in places where assessors are elected officials. Assessors, though, 
cannot simply underassess all properties because the millage rate could be adjusted upward to 
undo the effective impact of uniform underassessments. Instead, underassessment might happen 
only in certain areas where homeowners are more likely to vote in return for political support 
(Ross 2011 found this problem in Virginia).  In addition, underassessments dissuade 
homeownerss from appealing, which lowers the assessor’s work load since vociferous 
homeowners can be particularly vociferous and active (as described by Fischel 2005).  Similarly, 
as a way to balance out any underassessment, overassessments might occur where owners are not 
as well-informed about proper valuations.  A higher authority, like the FDOR in Florida, can 
help ensure the duty and incentives align so that assessment error is not purposely concentrated 
in certain areas.  To carry out that task each year, the FDOR calculates the level of assessment 
(LOA) for each county (as well as statistics, like dispersion and price-related differential).  If the 
LOA falls below a threshold, the assessor’s county is subject to penalties, which could include 
losing all homestead exemptions.  Such a loss would have a major impact on local funds and has 
never happened, which suggests that assessments are taken seriously by local assessors and the 
average numbers fall within reliable ranges (however, the average numbers are computed prior to 
any informal or formal appeals). 
Regarding appeals, the assessor has conflicting motives.  On the one hand, he/she would 
like to grant the appeal because there are benefits associated with keeping the homeowner happy.  
On the other hand, the assessor wants to defeat the appeal (or, if it is granted, bring the AV down 
only so far) to discourage others from filing appeals. To date, there has been no oversight of the 
informal conferences between assessors and homeowners, which makes it difficult to 
hypothesize and compare that part of the process with outcomes from formal appeals.  
 
Magistrates 
The goal of the magistrate, who makes the final decision in the formal hearing, is to conduct a 
fair appeals hearing and to provide an accurate legal decision on the property assessment. 
Magistrates undergo training on administrative procedures and must possess experience in real 
estate valuation.  The VABs who appoint the magistrates expect them to properly weigh, without 
bias, the evidence presented by the assessor and homeowner (or the tax representative) in 
reaching their decisions.  Decisions should support denials of underassessed properties and 
approve reductions of overassessed properties.  The magistrates are meant to be impartial 
decision-makers who are not part of the assessor’s office or another branch of the local 
government. Their duty is to provide recommendations to the VAB and those recommendations 
are almost always followed. 
 
AV/MV Ratios Before and After Appeals 
In this section, we present before and after AV/MV ratios separately for informal and formal 
appeals.  The latter are broken down into appeals filed with and without the use of a tax 
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representative.  We also show the percent of formal appeals receiving a reduction in AV 
conditional on homeowners’ pre-appeal assessment status (high, correct, or low).  Finally, we 
present the results of a multinomial logit model exploring the role of tax representatives in 
obtaining a low post-assessment AV/MV ratio. 
 
<--- Insert Table 7 about here ---> 
 
Table 7 reports the results for homeowners receiving an AV reduction from filing an 
informal appeal.  The results for all years essentially mimic those presented in Table 5: high 
percentages in the “high before, high after” group (50 percent) and the “low before, low after” 
group (24 percent), and a low percentage ending up with a correct assessment (11 percent).  
Also, the comparison of boom versus bust years shows an especially high percentage in the “low 
before, low after” group before the bust (45 percent) and in the “high before, high after” group 
after the bust (68 percent). 
 
<--- Insert Table 8 about here ---> 
 
Table 8 reports the results for homeowners receiving an AV reduction from filing a 
formal appeal.  Again, the results match up with those presented in Table 5.  For all years, there 
is a high percentage of homeowners in the “high before, high after” group (35 percent) and in the 
“low before, low after” group (24 percent).  The percentage who end up with a correct 
assessment (22 percent) is higher than what is observed for homeowners who filed an informal 
appeal (11 percent).  The comparison of boom versus bust years again shows a high percentage 
in the “low before, low after” group before the bust (38 percent) and a high percentage in the 
“high before, high after” group after the bust (40 percent).  The formal appeal results presented 
in Table 8 are further split between how homeowners file their appeals (on their own versus 
using a tax representative) and between the type of tax representatives (using a lawyer versus a 
realtor).  The within split patterns are highly similar between splits and mirror those previously 
discussed for the non-split sample. 
 
<--- Insert Table 9 about here ---> 
 
Table 9 uses the full sample of homeowners who filed a formal appeal (both those 
granted reductions or “winners” and those denied or “losers”) and shows the percentage of 
appeals that are granted conditional upon the homeowner’s pre-appeal assessment status (high, 
correct, or low).  Results are reported for the 24 and 12 month post-assessment sampling 
methods.  Both approaches show that AV reductions are obtained by a majority of homeowners 
who are overassessed prior to appealing, which casts a favorable light on the appeals process.  
Nevertheless, a large minority of overassessed homeowners do not receive a reduction.  In 
addition, each approach finds that the percentage of winners monotonically declines as we move 
down the columns from high to correct to low pre-appeal assessment status, which is what we 
would expect if appeals are granted based on the pre-appeal assessment status.  Still, a significant 
percentage of homeowners receive a reduction despite being underassessed before the appeal. 
The split between homeowners who file on their own and those who use a tax 
representative shows that, regardless of pre-appeal assessment status, owners who use a tax 
representative have a greater frequency of winning their appeal.  If the homeowner’s pre-
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assessment status is “high”, the frequency of receiving an assessed value reduction if a tax 
representative is used is especially high at between 70 to 74 percent.  The split between using a 
lawyer versus a realtor shows that the frequencies of an assessed value reduction, conditional on 
the pre-appeal assessment status, are similar between the two types of tax representatives. 
Throughout the last three tables, the results have shown that homeowners frequently 
receive an AV reduction even if their pre-appeal AV/MV ratio is low, or less than 0.95 (the 
percentage is still high even if the cutoff is 0.90).  Of interest is the role played by tax 
representatives in generating these unwarranted reductions.  To investigate this, we define formal 
post-appeal outcomes as belonging to three categories, 
 
𝑦 = {
1 high after 𝐴𝑉
𝑀𝑉
> 1.05
2 correct after 0.95 < 𝐴𝑉
𝑀𝑉
< 1.05
3 low after 𝐴𝑉
𝑀𝑉
< 0.95
 (2) 
 
and then estimate a multinomial logit model (“correct after” is the reference group) as 
 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗) =
{
 
 
 
 
𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝑿𝑖𝛽1)
1+𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑿𝑖𝛽2)+𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝑿𝑖𝛽3)
𝑗 = 1 𝑖𝑓 high after
1
1+𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑿𝑖𝛽1)+𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝑿𝑖𝛽3)
where 𝑗 = 2 if correct after
𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝑿𝑖𝛽3)
1+𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑿𝑖𝛽1)+𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝑿𝑖𝛽2)
𝑗 = 3 if low after
 (3) 
 
by maximizing a pseudolikelihood of ln 𝐿 =  ∑ 𝐼𝑗(𝑦𝑖)
3
𝑗=1 ln 𝑃(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗) where where 𝐼𝑗(𝑦𝑖) =
1[𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗] is the indicator function.  The vector of independent variables, Xi, contains dummy 
variables registering the pre-appeal assessment status and use of the two types of tax 
representatives (the reference group is “no representation”).  As the results show in Table 10, the 
use of a tax representative reduces the probability of having a post-appeal high assessment, but it 
does not affect the probability of falling into the post-appeal underassessed group.  In other 
words, the frequency of unwarranted reductions in AV is unrelated to the use of a tax 
representative in filing a formal appeal. 
 
<--- Insert Table 10 about here ---> 
 
To summarize this section’s results, there are a number of noteworthy findings: 
1. For both informal and formal appeals, a large percentage of the homeowners who receive 
a reduction in their assessed value fall into the “high before, high after” category.  These 
reductions are warranted but are too small in magnitude to bring homeowners to a correct 
assessment. 
2. For both types of appeal, many homeowners who receive AV reductions come into the 
process with a low assessment and leave with an even lower assessment.  These 
reductions are unwarranted and reduce the efficiency of the property tax in terms of it 
being an ad valorem tax.  As explained in section on the incentives of the participants, 
any unintentional formal reductions could stem from an attempt to balance out 
An Empirical Analysis of the Property Tax Appeals Process 
 
 13 
 
overassessments, garner votes, or to satisfy vocal homeowners. In the case of an informal 
appeal, unwarranted reductions might be a way to avoid the toils of a formal appeal. 
3. To the extent that the goal of the appeals process is to rectify incorrect assessments, it is 
falling short per the empirical results.  A relatively small percentage of the homeowners 
who receive AV reductions end up with correct assessments. 
4. While the above findings cast the appeals process in a bad light, a more favorable 
discovery is that a majority of overassessed homeowners receive reductions in their AV.  
However, a significant percentage of overassessed homeowners lose their appeals. 
5. Regardless of the homeowner’s pre-appeal assessment status, the use of a tax 
representative is associated with a higher winning percentage, especially among the 
group who come in overassessed. 
6. Controlling for the homeowners’ pre-appeal assessment status, the use of a tax 
representative decreases the probability of ending up with a high assessment, but has no 
effect on the probability of a post-appeal underassessment. 
 
The above findings suggest that there is a considerable degree of randomness within the 
property tax appeals process.  Part of this can be attributed to the inherent difficulty of valuing 
single-family homes.  But other factors also likely play a role; such as, differences among 
homeowners in their ability to present their case, among officials within the tax assessor’s office 
in their willingness to concede a case, among tax representatives in their level of expertise, and 
among magistrates in their ability to properly weigh the evidence presented at appeals hearings.  
Excessive randomness in awarding AV reductions weakens the efficiency of the property tax and 
creates horizontal inequities (that is, homes with identical MVs have different AVs).  As 
suggested above, the appeals process may also exacerbate vertical inequities in property taxation, 
an issue to which we now turn. 
 
AV Reductions across Neighborhood Types:  Specification Issues 
Table 6 reported that, controlling for overassessment, the probability of an AV reduction is higher 
in “high income, majority white” neighborhoods than in the other five neighborhood groups.  As 
noted, this may be the result of neighborhood differences in P(I), P(A), and/or P(F|A).  Before 
estimating these probabilities, it is important to rule out the possibility that Table 6’s results are 
caused by model misspecification.  One possible misspecification is sample selection bias, 
arising from the fact that not all properties turn over within two years of the date of assessment.  
A second possible misspecification is omitted variable bias, arising from a failure to account for 
the SOH wedge. 
To test for sample selection bias, we estimated Heckman’s sample selection model 
(Heckman 1979).  This model is described in the Appendix.  Regarding the SOH wedge, a large 
enough wedge can render an AV reduction moot because a homeowner’s property tax bill will 
not change if the reduced AV still lies above TV.  A wedge could be important for another reason.  
If it tends to vary systematically across neighborhood types, omitting a wedge may bias the 
estimated effects of the neighborhood type variables on the probability of obtaining an 
assessment reduction. 
 
<--- Insert Table 11 about here ---> 
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Table 11 reports the results from estimating the selection model and including a measure 
of the SOH wedge to the set of variables used to predict the probability of obtaining an AV 
reduction.  The columns in Table 11 differ by whether the overassessment and SOH variables are 
dummy or continuous variables.  The first column uses dummy variables where the SOH 
measure is simply whether there is no wedge (TV=AV in 27 percent of the cases) and the 
overassessment measure is its dummy variable version (having a value of one in 33 percent of 
the cases).  In the second column, the SOH measure is the TV/AV ratio (mean = 0.65) and the 
overassessment measure is the degree version (mean = 1.29). 
A comparison of the results in Table 11 with those in Table 6 shows that correcting for 
sample selection and accounting for SOH does not change the finding that homeowners from 
“high income, majority white” neighborhoods are more likely to receive an AV reduction. Thus, 
Table 6’s results cannot be attributed to specification issues addressed in this section. We repeat 
the exercises for a reduction in TV (instead of AV) and the results are nearly indistinguishable.  
Having assuaged two possible concerns of model specification that may have accounted for the 
findings presented in Table 6, we proceed to the estimates of P(I), P(A), and P(F|A). 
 
Estimation of the Probability of Obtaining an Informal Reduction in AV 
The first column of Table 12 reports the results from estimating the probability that a 
homeowner obtains an informal reduction in assessed value.  The explanatory variables are the 
neighborhood type dummy variables, the dummy variable versions of overassessment and the 
SOH wedge, and the percentage of the homeowner’s block group receiving an informal 
reduction, measured for each year.  The latter variable is included to capture the possibility that 
an individual homeowner is more likely to request an informal conference if he sees his 
neighbors succeeding in obtaining informal reductions. 
 
<--- Insert Table 12 about here ---> 
 
As expected, being overassessed increases the probability of an informal reduction in AV.  
Also, individual homeowners are more likely to obtain a reduction if they live in a neighborhood 
where more collective reductions are occurring.  The key result presented in Table 12 is that the 
probability of an informal reduction in AV is higher in “high income, majority white” 
neighborhoods than in three of the other neighborhood groups: “low income, majority black”, 
“low income, majority Hispanic”, and “low income, racially mixed.”  The probability is no 
different in the other types of neighborhoods.  Hence, the AV reduction advantage of 
homeowners in majority white neighborhoods can be partially attributed to the greater likelihood 
they have in obtaining informal reductions over some of the other neighborhood groups. 
 
Estimation of the Probability of Filing a Formal Appeal 
Next, we estimate the probability of filing a formal appeal.  These models include the 
neighborhood type variables, the dummy variable versions of overassessment and the SOH 
wedge, and three variables registering the amount of appeal activity occurring during the year of 
observation within the homeowner’s block group: the percentage of owners in the block group 
who are filing a formal appeal on their own without a representative, who are filing an appeal 
using a lawyer as the tax representative, and who are filing an appeal using a realtor as the tax 
representative.  These variables capture the demonstration effect from other neighborhood 
homeowners.  They may also register a solicitation effect by tax representatives: the individual 
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homeowner is more likely to have been contacted by a representative in a neighborhood where 
more homeowners are filing appeals using tax representatives. 
 
<--- Insert Table 13 about here ---> 
 
The formal appeal results are presented in Table 13.  As anticipated, the probability of 
filing a formal appeal is higher if the homeowner is overassessed or has no SOH wedge.  Also, 
regardless of whether appeals in the neighborhood come from homeowners filing appeals on 
their own or those using a tax representative, more neighborhood appeal activity increases the 
probability that the individual homeowner appeals.  The results obtained with the neighborhood 
variables show that the probability of appeal is higher in “high income, majority white” 
neighborhoods in comparison to other neighborhoods, with the exception of “low income, 
majority white” neighborhoods where the estimated coefficient is negative but not significant. 
The results reported in Table 13 may over- or understate the total effect of neighborhood 
type on the probability of appeal, because they only account for the direct effect of neighborhood 
type.  In addition to the direct effect, there may be an indirect effect if the degree of appeal 
activity varies systematically across neighborhood types.  For example, the probability of filing 
an appeal may be higher if the homeowner lives in a majority white neighborhood because he is 
more likely to be better educated and informed about the appeals process (a direct effect).  In 
addition, a homeowner in a majority white neighborhood may also have a higher appeal 
probability because of greater neighborhood appeal activity (for example, there may be an 
indirect effect of neighborhood type on the probability of appeal that works through the percent 
of block group appealing variables).  To investigate this, three auxiliary OLS regression models 
were estimated at the block group level with the following dependent variables: the percentage of 
the block group filing on their own, the percentage of the block group filing with an attorney, 
and the percentage of the block group filing with a realtor.  Neighborhood type dummy 
indicators serve as the independent variables. 
 
<--- Insert Table 14 about here ---> 
 
The results, reported in Table 14, show that homeowners in “high income, majority 
white” neighborhoods have a higher percentage of their neighbors filing appeals without the use 
of a representative in comparison to homeowners in “high income, majority black”, “high 
income, majority Hispanic”, and “high income, racially mixed” neighborhoods.  The second 
column illustrates that the homeowners in “high income, majority white” neighborhoods have a 
higher percentage of their neighbors filing appeals using an attorney as the tax representative in 
comparison to homeowners in “low income, majority black”, “high income, majority black”, 
“high income, majority Hispanic”, and “high income, racially mixed” neighborhoods.  The last 
column has the strongest findings, which show that homeowners in “high income, majority 
white” neighborhoods have a higher percentage of their neighbors filing appeals using a realtor 
as the tax representative in comparison to all of the nonwhite neighborhood groups (except for 
“low income, majority Hispanic”).  In contrast to the negative coefficients on the nonwhite 
neighborhood types, homeowners in “low income, majority white” neighborhoods have a higher 
percentage of their neighbors filing appeals with a tax representative than homeowners in “high 
income, majority white” neighborhoods.  These results indicate that homeowners in majority 
white neighborhoods, regardless of their income level, have a higher probability of filing a 
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formal appeal because they tend to live in neighborhoods where more appeal activity is 
occurring.  Thus, indirect effects, like the direct effects reported in Table 13, favor homeowners 
in “high income, majority white” neighborhoods. 
 
<--- Insert Table 15 about here ---> 
 
Table 15 reports the direct, indirect, and total effects of the neighborhood type variables 
on the probability of filing a formal appeal.  Total effects are roughly twice the size of the direct 
effects and strongly reinforce the conclusion that the probability of filing a formal appeal is 
higher among homeowners living in majority white neighborhoods (both high and low income) 
in comparison to homeowners living in all of the minority neighborhood groups. 
 
Estimation of the Probability of Winning a Formal Appeal 
The final set of probit models estimate the homeowner’s probability of receiving a reduction in 
his assessed value conditional on having filed a formal appeal (P(F|A)).  The model includes the 
neighborhood type variables and the dummy variables for overassessment and the SOH wedge.  
Results are presented in Table 16 for a reduction in AV (the TV results are qualitatively similar).  
The first column has a dummy variable indicating whether the appeal was filed by a tax 
representative.  In the second column, separate dummy variables distinguish whether a tax 
representative was a lawyer or realtor. 
 
<--- Insert Table 16 about here ---> 
 
Overassessed homeowners are more likely to win their appeal, as are homeowners who 
turn to a tax representative.  A successful appeal does not depend on the type of representative 
utilized.  Homeowners with no SOH wedge are also more likely to have a successful appeal.  For 
these owners, a reduction in TV is guaranteed if they win their appeal, so they may push harder to 
have that occur.  Regarding the neighborhood type variables, only two are statistically 
significant: “low income, majority white” and “high income, racially mixed.”  Homeowners 
living in these neighborhood have a lower probability of winning their appeal in comparison to 
homeowners in “high income, majority white” neighborhoods. 
 
<--- Insert Table 17 about here ---> 
 
Analogous to the estimation of P(A), the estimated effects of the neighborhood type variables on 
P(F|A) may not fully capture their total effects if there are indirect effects working through the 
other explanatory variables.  As shown in Table 3 and discussed in the section on the description 
of data, homeowners in majority white neighborhoods more frequently utilize a tax 
representative in filing their appeals.  This is confirmed in Table 17, which shows the results 
from estimating the probability of using a tax representative as a function of the neighborhood 
type variables, controlling for overassessment and the SOH wedge.  Hence, the total effect of 
neighborhood type on P(F|A) includes the indirect effect that neighborhood type has working 
through its effect on choosing to use a tax representative. 
 
<--- Insert Table 18 about here ---> 
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Table 18 reports the direct, indirect, and total effects of neighborhood type on P(F|A).  
The estimated indirect effects all show that the higher utilization of tax representatives among 
homeowners in “high income, majority white” neighborhoods increases their probability of 
winning their appeal in comparison to all of the nonwhite neighborhood groups, with the 
exception of the “low income, racially mixed” group.  The estimated indirect effect for the “low 
income, majority white” and “low income, racially mixed” neighborhood types are not 
statistically significant.  Accounting for these indirect effects substantially alters the P(F|A) 
results: in comparison to the estimated direct effects where only one of the six nonwhite 
neighborhood type variables is negative and significant, the estimated total (direct plus indirect) 
effects show that all but two of the nonwhite neighborhood type variables are negative and 
significant (the exceptions are “low income, majority black” which is negative but insignificant 
and “low income, racially mixed” which is positive but insignificant).  Clearly, the higher 
utilization of tax representatives by homeowners living in “high income, majority white” 
neighborhoods improves their chances of winning their appeal relative to homeowners from 
nonwhite neighborhoods. 
 
<--- Insert Table 19 about here ---> 
 
Finally, to draw together previous results, Table 19 presents a decomposition of an AV 
reduction that is based on the P(R) summary described by Equation (1).  The purpose is to show 
which part of the appeals process (receiving an informal reduction, filing a formal appeal, or 
winning a formal appeal) carries the most weight in explaining a neighborhood’s disadvantage 
relative to the “high income, majority white” reference group.  The table is split into magnitudes 
and absolute percentages.  The first two columns of P(R) compare the estimated marginal effect 
from Table 6 with the predicted marginal effect obtained by calculating the total derivative of 
Equation (1), or 𝑑𝑃(𝑅) = 𝑑𝑃(𝐼) + 𝑑𝑃(𝐴) ∙ 𝑃(𝐹|𝐴) + 𝑃(𝐴) ∙ 𝑑𝑃(𝐹|𝐴).  Means values 
(𝑃(𝐹|𝐴) = 0.4947 and 𝑃(𝐴) = 0.0238) are computed over the entire sample and the dP(I), 
dP(A), and dP(F|A) are the estimates reported in Tables 12, 15, and 18.  There are minor 
differences between the estimated and predicted marginal effects (due to sample variance in the 
estimated coefficients) but the overall resemblances add credence to the results presented for 
individual components of the property tax appeals process.  The next three columns report the 
estimated partial derivatives for dP(I), dP(A), and dP(F|A).  In the last three columns, we 
compare the relative impact of each part of the process by dividing by the sum of the absolute 
value of the components.  A positive percentage value indicates that the part has the same sign as 
the predicted marginal effect and, therefore, helps to explain the magnitude of the marginal 
effect.  A negative sign points out an opposing effect that reduces the absolute magnitude of the 
marginal effect.  While the results vary across neighborhood groups, generally they show that all 
three parts of the appeal process  play an important role in explaining the disadvantage that 
homeowners from nonwhite neighborhoods have in obtaining an appeals-related reduction in 
their assessed value (relative to homeowners from “high income, majority white” 
neighborhoods). 
 
Conclusions 
We have undertaken an in-depth evaluation of the property tax appeals process using a 
remarkably rich dataset for a large Florida county.  One of our objectives is to assess whether the 
appeals process rectifies assessment errors.  The results indicate that appeals-related reductions 
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in AV infrequently result in correct assessments and that a sizeable percentage of reductions are 
given to homeowners who already are underassessed prior to appeal.  To be fair, we do find a 
positive outcome from the appeals process: a majority of overassessed homeowners receive an 
AV reduction; nevertheless, the assessment is frequently not adjusted downward enough to be 
classified in a “correct” range. 
Our second objective is to evaluate the fairness of the appeals process.  Our findings 
indicate that if there are two homeowners—one from a majority white neighborhood and another 
from a majority nonwhite neighborhood who share the same pre-appeal assessment status—the 
one from the majority white neighborhood is more likely to receive a reduction in AV.  Because 
the latter homeowners have higher incomes, the appeals process contributes to the regressivity of 
the property tax.  According to our results, the advantage that homeowners from white 
neighborhoods have in obtaining an AV reduction stems from them having a higher probability of 
receiving an informal reduction, a higher probability of filing a formal appeal, and a higher 
probability of winning their appeal conditional upon filing.  The latter two probabilities are 
strongly associated with the higher utilization of tax representatives by homeowners from 
majority white neighborhoods.  This higher utilization is consistent with the recent newspaper 
accounts (cited in the introduction of this paper) suggesting that these homeowners are targeted 
by tax representatives who attempt to maximize their contingency fees.  Our data, however, do 
not enable us to rule out the possibility that the higher utilization of tax representatives by 
homeowners from majority white neighborhoods is the result of these homeowners choosing on 
their own, without solicitation, to use a tax representative in filing their formal appeal.  The data 
also preclude us from knowing whether the representatives pursue appeal cases that have a 
higher likelihood of success.  However, because we control for assessment error, endogeneity 
bias can only result if there is some other characteristic of the case that tax representatives use to 
identify a successful appeal.  We can think of no such characteristic. 
While the results reveal deficiencies in the appeals process, we do not suggest abridging 
the right to appeal.  Homeowners must have recourse to challenging perceived errors in their 
property tax assessments and this is provided by the right to appeal.  However, the results 
suggest changes could be made to make the appeals process more efficient and equitable: 
1. There may be an incentive on the part of the tax assessor to satisfy a complaining 
homeowner who has filed an informal appeal. Currently, there is no requirement to 
record informal changes (or denials) on the tax rolls or anywhere else.  The purpose of 
informal conferences might be limited to the tax assessor explaining to the homeowner 
the basis for his assessment.  Based upon this explanation, the homeowner could then 
decide whether or not to file a formal appeal. 
2. Regarding formal appeals, the data indicate that many homeowners receive unwarranted 
reductions in their assessed value.  One policy option is to require appellants to satisfy a 
higher evidentiary standard showing that they are right and that the assessor is wrong.  
This must be done with care, however, because the results also suggest that many 
homeowners who merit a reduction fail to receive one.  Ideally, the standard would be set 
so as to minimize unwarranted reductions without decreasing the chances of an 
overassessed homeowner receiving a deserved reduction.  Unfortunately, it is no easy 
task to translate a statistical value into a legal standard and U.S. states use a variety of 
burden of proofs that include “every-reasonable-hypothesis”, “the preponderance of 
evidence”, and even “incorrect”.  While the first burden is extremely difficult to prove in 
favor of the appellant, the last burden is far too vague and invites unwarranted appeals.  
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Some consistency across states could encourage a better distribution of representatives 
across the country.  Another policy option depends on whether unwarranted reductions 
are random or systematic with respect to individuals who represent the assessor’s office 
at the hearings and/or the magistrate who rules on the appeal.  Following our approach to 
obtaining MV, both public servants could be “graded” by using post-assessment sales to 
determine how often an unwarranted reduction occurs. 
3. The findings suggest that the advantage homeowners from majority white neighborhoods 
have in obtaining a reduction in their assessed value stems largely from their greater use 
of a tax representative.  This higher use may be the result of tax representatives targeting 
their solicitations toward the neighborhoods where their contingency fees will be the 
greatest. However, the evidence we have provided suggests that representatives are not 
responsible for homeowners receiving unwarranted reductions and they do assist 
overassessed homeowners in obtaining a reduction in their assessed value.  We therefore 
do not recommend imposing constraints on their behavior or outlawing the use of 
contingency fees (as has been proposed in some state legislatures).  Instead, we offer two 
suggestions to encourage participation.  First, a public campaign could educate minority 
and low-income homeowners about their rights, the proper steps for lodging an appeal, 
and when an appeal might be appropriate.  Second, we borrow two ideas from the justice 
system to suggest that tax representatives should be encouraged to undertake pro bono 
work and, where help is still needed, public tax representatives could be appointed to 
assist homeowners from nonwhite neighborhoods in filing formal appeals.  The right to 
appeal would be further enhanced by this idea of a public tax representative. 
 
The property tax appeals process is virtually identical across Florida.  Moreover, the main 
features of the Florida system (a public assessor, informal conferences, a VAB that rules on 
formal appeals, and tax representatives that work on a contingency fee basis) are common to 
other states.  Every state allows property owners the right to appeal in an informal and formal 
setting as we have described.  The incentives that give rise to the defects we have found in the 
Florida appeals process are, therefore, likely to have created similar problems elsewhere.  In light 
of the concerning empirical analysis that we find and because our effort can be considered 
pioneering, we strongly encourage investigations of property tax appeals processes in other 
places, both within and outside the United States.  The techniques outlined in this paper could be 
helpful when evaluating property tax appeals and their outcomes. 
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Appendix: The Sample Selection Model 
 
The sample selection model consists of two equations: the primary equation, where the 
dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to one if the property received an AV reduction, 
and the sample selection equation, where the dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to 
one if the property was recorded as having a qualified arms-length sales transaction.  Assuming 
joint normality of the error terms, the two equations can be estimated together using maximum 
likelihood estimation.  Formally, the model is written as 
 
𝑅𝑖
∗ = 𝑿𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖 (A1) 
𝑆𝑖
∗ = 𝑿𝑖𝛾 + 𝑍𝑖𝛿 + 𝜔𝑖 (A2) 
 
where (εi , ωi) are distributed i.i.d. N(0,0,1,1,ρ) and 𝑅𝑖
∗ and 𝑆𝑖
∗ are latent variables.  Unselected 
observations are those homes in the five-year sample that do not sell during the post-assessment 
period (or within two years of the month of assessment, n=1,373,072) and selected observations 
are those homes in the post-assessment sales sample (n=80,393), or 𝑆𝑖 = 1[𝑆𝑖
∗ > 0].  The vector 
of regressors, Xi, includes the set of dummy variables that denote the neighborhood group where 
a property is located and whether the property was overassessed.  The sample selection model 
must include a variable, Zi,that predicts the censored/uncensored split and that does not belong in 
the primary equation.  We use the time (in years) that has expired between when the house was 
last sold and the date of assessment. Residential mobility studies (a review can be found in 
Quigley and Weinberg 1977) show that the probability of turnover declines with the length of 
tenure, but we can think of no reason there would be a relationship between tenure duration and 
the probability that the homeowner receives a reduction in AV.  The selection variable is highly 
statistically significant with a negative sign: the longer the time between the last sales year and 
the year of assessment, the less likely the house will be sold in the next two years.  A Wald test 
indicates that the results in Table 6 contain sample selection bias. 
 
  
Number of 
single-
family 
housing 
units
Number of 
informal 
reductions 
in assessed 
value
Number of 
formal 
appeals
Percent of 
formal 
appeals 
granted
Percent of 
formal 
appeals 
filed using 
lawyer
Percent of 
formal 
appeals 
filed using 
realtor
Success 
rate, no 
tax rep.
Success 
rate, 
lawyer
Success 
rate, 
realtor
2005 306,594 369 3,640 40.6 51.6 32.8 41.5 41.5 38.7
2006 306,946 1,016 4,740 45.6 43.4 32.0 42.3 48.1 44.9
2007 307,061 1,386 6,287 50.5 41.8 36.1 40.9 53.5 52.8
2008 307,656 1,568 10,452 49.7 34.3 31.9 34.5 58.2 56.6
2009 366,196 6,313 14,441 50.8 28.4 34.3 25.7 71.3 61.2
Table 1
Characteristics of the appeals process
 
 
  
Percent of 
homeowners 
receiving 
informal 
reductions
Percent of 
homeowners 
receiving 
formal 
reductions
Percent of total 
single-family 
properties
Median housing 
value
Median reduction 
in AV  from a 
formal appeal
Neighborhood Type
     Low Income, Majority Black 30.8 14.0 18.5 188,184 23,736
     High Income, Majority Black 0.8 1.4 3.4 220,314 29,586
     Low Income, Majority Hispanic 6.8 25.9 25.9 275,913 31,486
     High Income, Majority Hispanic 26.0 23.4 27.5 352,151 39,651
     Low Income, Majority White 0.6 1.8 0.7 552,442 63,767
     High Income, Majority White 19.4 26.4 15.0 589,499 78,012
     Low Income, Racially Mixed 5.2 4.5 4.5 238,618 33,439
     High Income, Racially Mixed 11.0 4.2 5.9 319,819 39,077
Table 2
Neighborhood type descriptors
Note: The first three columns' percentages are calculated over the years 2005--2009 for all single-family homeowners who received an informal reduction, 
who received a formal reduction, and whose property was listed on the tax rolls, respectively.
 
 
  
All years 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Neighborhood Type
     Low Income, Majority Black
          % using representative 62 71 60 73 60 58
          % using lawyer 28 36 27 31 27 28
          % using realtor 33 34 34 42 33 29
     High Income, Majority Black
          % using representative 63 88 47 77 58 48
          % using lawyer 33 56 25 32 29 25
          % using realtor 30 32 22 45 29 23
     Low Income, Majority Hispanic
          % using representative 69 85 74 77 66 62
          % using lawyer 35 51 42 40 35 27
          % using realtor 34 34 33 37 31 34
     High Income, Majority Hispanic
          % using representative 68 83 76 81 64 61
          % using lawyer 32 53 44 42 31 22
          % using realtor 36 30 32 39 32 39
     Low Income, Majority White
          % using representative 76 92 86 79 70 63
          % using lawyer 47 56 51 51 42 42
          % using realtor 29 35 35 28 28 22
     High Income, Majority White
          % using representative 78 87 81 81 75 72
          % using lawyer 44 53 48 47 41 39
          % using realtor 34 34 34 34 34 33
     Low Income, Racially Mixed
          % using representative 63 83 67 70 58 58
          % using lawyer 37 60 43 43 31 32
          % using realtor 26 23 24 26 26 27
     High Income, Racially Mixed
          % using representative 64 77 73 73 61 58
          % using lawyer 35 53 50 44 32 26
          % using realtor 29 24 23 30 29 32
Table 3
Use of tax representative in filing single-family appeals
(by type of neighborhood)
 
 
  
Percent 
tax rep.
Percent 
lawyer
Percent 
realtor
Neighborhood Type
     Low Income, Majority Black 1.12 0.47 0.64
     High Income, Majority Black 0.65 0.34 0.31
     Low Income, Majority Hispanic 1.69 0.86 0.83
     High Income, Majority Hispanic 1.63 0.76 0.87
     Low Income, Majority White 4.38 2.75 1.63
     High Income, Majority White 3.84 2.05 1.80
     Low Income, Racially Mixed 1.57 0.93 0.65
     High Income, Racially Mixed 1.38 0.76 0.62
Table 4
Percent of neighborhood filing a formal appeal using a tax representative
Note: Percentages are for all single-family homeowners on the 2005--2009 tax rolls who filed a 
formal appeal using a tax representative, lawyer, or realtor.
 
 
 
  
All years 2005—2007 2008—2009
Before AV Reduction 1.2411 1.0386 1.3497
After AV Reduction 1.0583 0.9115 1.1371
High Before, High After 563 (40) 114 (23) 449 (48)
High Before, Correct After 214 (15) 59 (12) 155 (17)
High Before, Low After 70 (5) 21 (4) 49 (5)
Correct Before, Correct After 45 (3) 21 (4) 24 (3)
Correct Before, Low After 109 (8) 55 (11) 54 (6)
Low Before, Low After 342 (24) 199 (41) 143 (15)
High Before, High After  448 (32) 75 (15) 373 (40)
High Before, Correct After  282 (20) 82 (17) 200 (22)
High Before, Low After  27 (2) 10 (2) 17 (2)
Correct Before, Correct After  179 (13) 71 (14) 108 (12)
Correct Before, Low After  137 (10) 75 (15) 62 (7)
Low Before, Low After  270 (19) 156 (32) 114 (12)
Observations 1,418 490 928
All appeals
Table 5
Assessment ratios (AV/MV) before and after reductions
in assessed values from appeals
Notes: Magnitudes are shown and percentages are in parentheses.  The definitions of 
High, Correct, and Low depend on the ` `Correct'' value interval.  For the middle panel 
above, ` `High'' is where AV/MV > 1.05 , ` `Correct'' is .95 ≤  AV/MV ≤ 1.05 , and ` `Low'' is 
AV/MV < .95 .
"Correct": 0.95 ≤ AV/MV ≤ 1.05
"Correct": 0.90 ≤ AV/MV ≤ 1.10
  
 
  
How overassessment is measured:
Dummy 
variable Degree
Neighborhood Type
     Low Income, Majority Black -0.0089*** -0.0137***
(0.0006) (0.0006)
     High Income, Majority Black -0.0100*** -0.0125***
(0.0006) (0.0006)
     Low Income, Majority Hispanic -0.0094*** -0.0129***
(0.0007) (0.0007)
     High Income, Majority Hispanic -0.0073*** -0.0094***
(0.0007) (0.0007)
     Low Income, Majority White -0.0046** -0.0054**
(0.0020) (0.0023)
     Low Income, Racially Mixed -0.0061*** -0.0083***
(0.0008) (0.0008)
     High Income, Racially Mixed -0.0066*** -0.0082***
(0.0008) (0.0008)
Overassessed (yes = 1 ) 0.0293***
(0.0013)
Degree of Overassessment 0.0200***
(0.0009)
Observations 83,868 83,868
Table 6
Probability of obtaining a reduction in assessed value
Notes: Reported coefficients are marginal effects (i.e., the change in the 
probability for an infinitesimally small change in a continuous variable and 
the discrete change in the probability for a dummy variable). Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses.
**, *** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
 
 
  
All years 2005—2007 2008—2009
Before AV Reduction 1.3299 0.9962 1.5216
After AV Reduction 1.1610 0.8743 1.3257
High Before, High After 222 (50) 28 (18) 194 (68)
High Before, Correct After 29 (7) 12 (8) 17 (6)
High Before, Low After 19 (4) 10 (6) 9 (3)
Correct Before, Correct After 18 (4) 12 (8) 6 (2)
Correct Before, Low After 28 (6) 20 (13) 8 (3)
Low Before, Low After 106 (24) 72 (45) 34 (12)
Observations 446 159 287
Notes: Magnitudes are shown and percentages are in parentheses.  The definitions of 
High, Correct, and Low depend on the ` `Correct'' value interval.  For the middle panel 
above, ` `High'' is where AV/MV > 1.05 , ` `Correct'' is .95 ≤  AV/MV ≤ 1.05 , and ` `Low'' is 
AV/MV < .95 .
Table 7
Results of informal appeal
 
 
  
All years 2005—2007 2008—2009
     Before Appeal, AV/MV Mean 1.2085 1.0597 1.2844
     After Appeal, AV/MV Mean 1.0146 0.9285 1.0586
     High Before, High After 352 (35) 87 (26) 265 (40)
     High Before, Correct After 189 (19) 48 (14) 141 (21)
     High Before, Low After 55 (6) 11 (3) 44 (7)
     Correct Before, Correct After 27 (3) 9 (3) 18 (3)
     Correct Before, Low After 83 (8) 36 (11) 47 (7)
     Low Before, Low After 238 (24) 128 (38) 110 (17)
     Observations 997 335 662
All years 2005—2007 2008—2009 All years 2005—2007 2008—2009
     Before Appeal, AV/MV Mean 1.3586 1.1473 1.4163 1.1578 1.0430 1.2281
     After Appeal, AV/MV Mean 1.0799 0.9445 1.1169 0.9926 0.9254 1.0338
     High Before, High After 116 (47) 17 (32) 99 (51) 236 (31) 70 (25) 166 (35)
     High Before, Correct After 49 (20) 7 (13) 42 (22) 140 (19) 41 (15) 99 (21)
     High Before, Low After 18 (7) 3 (6) 15 (8) 37 (5) 8 (3) 29 (6)
     Correct Before, Correct After 7 (3) 1 (2) 6 (3) 20 (3) 8 (3) 12 (3)
     Correct Before, Low After 15 (6) 6 (11) 9 (5) 68 (9) 30 (11) 38 (8)
     Low Before, Low After 33 (13) 17 (32) 16 (8) 205 (27) 111 (39) 94 (20)
     Observations 246 53 193 751 282 469
All years 2005—2007 2008—2009 All years 2005—2007 2008—2009
     Before Appeal, AV/MV Mean 1.1503 1.0622 1.2165 1.1666 1.0133 1.2395
     After Appeal, AV/MV Mean 0.9990 0.9404 1.0430 0.9852 0.9022 1.0247
     High Before, High After 117 (29) 41 (24) 76 (32) 119 (34) 29 (26) 90 (38)
     High Before, Correct After 78 (19) 24 (14) 54 (23) 62 (18) 17 (15) 45 (19)
     High Before, Low After 17 (4) 5 (3) 12 (5) 20 (6) 3 (3) 17 (7)
     Correct Before, Correct After 13 (3) 5 (3) 8 (3) 7 (2) 3 (3) 4 (2)
     Correct Before, Low After 47 (12) 21 (12) 26 (11) 21 (6) 9 (8) 12 (5)
     Low Before, Low After 108 (27) 67 (40) 41 (18) 97 (28) 44 (39) 53 (23)
     Observations 403 169 234 348 113 235
All cases
Notes: Magnitudes are shown and percentages are in parentheses.  The definitions of High, 
Correct, and Low are as follows: ` `High'' is where AV/MV > 1.05 , ` `Correct'' is  .95 ≤ AV/MV ≤ 1.05 , 
and ` `Low'' is AV/MV < .95 .
Table 8
Results of formal appeals
Without tax representative With tax representative
Lawyer tax representative Realtor tax representative
 
 
  
Post-assessment sales sample:
Cases % reduction Cases % reduction
All Cases
     High 609 60 456 65
     Correct 114 42 65 40
     Low 251 37 75 23
No Tax Rep.
     High 196 46 165 53
     Correct 25 36 18 39
     Low 40 29 16 22
Yes Tax Rep.
     High 413 70 291 74
     Correct 89 44 47 41
     Low 211 39 59 23
Lawyer Tax Rep.
     High 212 73 143 72
     Correct 60 52 29 47
     Low 112 38 31 22
Realtor Tax Rep.
     High 201 67 148 76
     Correct 29 34 18 33
     Low 99 40 28 25
Notes: The total (restricted) property sample has post-assessment sales within 24 (12) or fewer months 
after the month of assessment.  The definitions of High, Correct, and Low are as follows: ` `High'' is where 
AV/MV > 1.05 , ` `Correct'' is .95 ≤ AV/MV ≤ 1.05 , and ` `Low'' is AV/MV < .95 .
Table 9
Percent of formal appeals receiving reduction in assessed value
(by pre-appeal assessment status)
Restricted (12 months)Total (24 months)
 
 
  
Dependent variable:  High After Low After
     Low, Before -0.6051*** 23.1051***
(0.0893) (0.1611)
     Correct, Before -23.6441*** 0.4884**
(0.1148) (0.2008)
     Tax Representative, Lawyer -0.8762*** 0.2077
(0.1904) (0.2462)
     Tax Representative, Realtor -0.6803*** -0.0520
(0.1896) (0.2675)
Observations 1,961 1,961
**, *** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 10
Multinomial logistic regression of
formal appeals outcomes
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The definitions of High, Correct, and Low are as 
follows: ` `High'' is where AV/MV > 1.05 , ` `Correct'' is .95 ≤ AV/MV ≤ 1.05 , and ` `Low'' is AV/MV < .95 .
 
 
  
How overassessment is measured: Dummy 
variable
Degree
Neighborhood Type
     Low Income, Majority Black -.0196*** -.0144***
(.0017) (.0009)
     High Income, Majority Black -.0195*** -.0118***
(.0034) (.0017)
     Low Income, Majority Hispanic -.0184*** -.0126***
(.0016) (.0009)
     High Income, Majority Hispanic -.0157*** -.0102***
(.0016) (.0009)
     Low Income, Majority White -.0085* -.0048*
(.0047) (.0028)
     Low Income, Racially Mixed -.0144*** -.0089***
(.0021) (.0012)
     High Income, Racially Mixed -.0127*** -.0078***
(.0021) (.0012)
Overassessed (yes = 1 ) .0410***
(.0015)
Degree of Overassessment .0184***
(.0008)
No SOH (TV/AV = 1 , yes = 1) .0312***
(.0024)
TV/AV .0443***
(.0034)
Observations 80,393 80,393
Wald χ2 Test (ρ=0) 4.62 0.05
Prob > χ2(1) 0.03 0.8192
Notes: Reported coefficients are marginal effects from the primary 
equation of the Heckman model (i.e., the change in the probability for an 
infinitesimally small change in a continuous variable and the discrete 
change in the probability for a dummy variable). Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. Only primary probit equation results and uncensored 
observations are reported.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively.
Table 11
Probability of obtaining a reduction in assessed value
(accounting for Save Our Homes and sample selection)
 
 
  
Dependent variable: Assessed 
value
Neighborhood Type
     Low Income, Majority Black -.0084*
(.0049)
     High Income, Majority Black -.0101
(.0090)
     Low Income, Majority Hispanic -.0103**
(.0046)
     High Income, Majority Hispanic .0005
(.0039)
     Low Income, Majority White .0102
(.0121)
     Low Income, Racially Mixed -.0126**
(.0054)
     High Income, Racially Mixed .0006
(.0051)
Overassessed (yes = 1 ) .0224***
(.0028)
No SOH (TV/AV = 1 , yes = 1) .0077
(.0054)
% BG Reduction .0039***
(.0003)
Observations 80,393
Wald χ2 Test (ρ=0) 5.20
Prob > χ2(1) 0.02
Notes: Reported coefficients are marginal effects from the primary 
equation of the Heckman model (i.e., the change in the probability for an 
infinitesimally small change in a continuous variable and the discrete 
change in the probability for a dummy variable). Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. Only primary probit equation results and uncensored 
observations are reported.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.
Probability of obtaining an informal reduction
(accounting for Save Our Homes and sample selection)
Table 12
 
  
How tax representation is measured: One type Split up
Neighborhood Type
     Low Income, Majority Black -.0207*** -.0210***
(.0016) (.0017)
     High Income, Majority Black -.0159*** -.0162***
(.0030) (.0031)
     Low Income, Majority Hispanic -.0116*** -.0116***
(.0016) (.0016)
     High Income, Majority Hispanic -.0120*** -.0117***
(.0015) (.0015)
     Low Income, Majority White -.0041 -.0049
(.0044) (.0045)
     Low Income, Racially Mixed -.0121*** -.0121***
(.0021) (.0021)
     High Income, Racially Mixed -.0098*** -.0099***
(.0021) (.0021)
Overassessed (yes = 1 ) .0251*** .0261***
(.0013) (.0013)
No SOH (TV/AV = 1 , yes = 1 ) .0356*** .0364***
(.0021) (.0022)
% BG Appeal, Tax Representative .0032***
(.0001)
% BG Appeal, Lawyer .0043***
(.0002)
% BG Appeal, Realtor .0022***
(.0003)
Observations 80,393 80,393
Wald χ2 Test (ρ=0) 1.91 2.21
Prob > χ2(1) 0.17 0.14
Notes: Reported coefficients are marginal effects from the primary equation 
of the Heckman model (i.e., the change in the probability for an 
infinitesimally small change in a continuous variable and the discrete 
change in the probability for a dummy variable). Robust standard errors are 
in parentheses. Only primary probit equation results and uncensored 
observations are reported.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% elvel.
Table 13
Probability of filing a formal appeal
(accounting for Save Our Homes and sample selection)
 
  
Dependent variable: No tax rep. Lawyer Realtor
Neighborhood Type
     Low Income, Majority Black 0.0416 -1.3778*** -1.1799***
(0.1384) (0.2169) (0.1404)
     High Income, Majority Black -0.5392*** -1.0689* -0.9993***
(0.1117) (0.5714) (0.3208)
     Low Income, Majority Hispanic 0.2353 0.0051 0.1320
(0.1437) (0.2471) (0.2132)
     High Income, Majority Hispanic -0.2740*** -1.3126*** -0.8361***
(0.0775) (0.1663) (0.1503)
     Low Income, Majority White -0.0449 8.9323*** 5.7540***
(0.1901) (2.0251) (2.0457)
     Low Income, Racially Mixed -0.0709 0.3359 -0.7726***
(0.1228) (0.5783) (0.2669)
     High Income, Racially Mixed -0.3422*** -1.2603*** -0.9045***
(0.0954) (0.2046) (0.2901)
R2 0.00 0.05 0.04
Observations 4,482 4,482 4,482
* and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 14
OLS models of percent of neighborhood filing formal appeal
(without a tax representative, with a lawyer, and with a realtor)
Notes: Reported coefficients are marginal effects.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
 
 
  
Direct Indirect Total
Neighborhood Type
     Low Income, Majority Black -.0104*** -.0063*** -.0167***
(.0007) (.0005) (.0009)
     High Income, Majority Black -.0079*** -.0067*** -.0146***
(.0016) (.0013) (.0021)
     Low Income, Majority Hispanic -.0062*** -.0043*** -.0105***
(.0007) (.0005) (.0009)
     High Income, Majority Hispanic -.0052*** -.0046*** -.0097***
(.0007) (.0006) (.0009)
     Low Income, Majority White -.0026 .0046** .0020
(.0021) (.0020) (.0037)
     Low Income, Racially Mixed -.0071*** -.0044*** -.0116***
(.0010) (.0007) (.0012)
     High Income, Racially Mixed -.0053*** -.0047*** -.0100***
(.0010) (.0007) (.0012)
Notes: Reported coefficients are marginal effects from a non-linear combination of 
partial derivatives from seemingly unrelated regressions (i.e., the change in the 
probability for an infinitesimally small change in a continuous variable and the discrete 
change in the probability for a dummy variable).  Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses.
** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Total probability of filing a formal appeal
Table 15
Accounting for the effects
 
 
  
How tax representation is measured: One type Split up
Neighborhood Type
     Low Income, Majority Black .0023 -.0235***
(.0434) (.0085)
     High Income, Majority Black -.1074 -.0690***
(.1152) (.0228)
     Low Income, Majority Hispanic -.0133 -.0226***
(.0340) (.0067)
     High Income, Majority Hispanic -.0499 -.0147***
(.0308) (.0057)
     Low Income, Majority White -.1970** -.0153
(.0882) (.0158)
     Low Income, Racially Mixed .0557 -.0058
(.0562) (.0097)
     High Income, Racially Mixed -.1483*** -.0226**
(.0529) (.0529)
Overassessed (yes = 1 ) .2431*** .2444***
(.0234) (.0234)
No SOH (TV/AV = 1 , yes = 1 ) .3351*** .3336***
(.0298) (.0299)
Tax Representative .1821***
(.0255)
Tax Representative, Lawyer .1958***
(.0286)
Tax Representative, Realtor .169***
(.0297)
Observations 1,961 1,961
** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 16
Probability of reduction in assessed value given a formal appeal
Notes: Reported coefficients are marginal effects from a non-linear combination of partial 
derivatives from seemingly unrelated regressions (i.e., the change in the probability for an 
infinitesimally small change in a continuous variable and the discrete change in the 
probability for a dummy variable).  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
 
 
  
Dependent variable: Tax rep.
Neighborhood Type
     Low Income, Majority Black -.1293***
(.0437)
     High Income, Majority Black -.3792***
(.1043)
     Low Income, Majority Hispanic -.1239***
(.0329)
     High Income, Majority Hispanic -.0807***
(.0292)
     Low Income, Majority White -.0840
(.0890)
     Low Income, Racially Mixed -.0319
(.0540)
     High Income, Racially Mixed -.1241**
(.0542)
Overassessed (yes = 1 ) -.1913***
(.0205)
No SOH (TV/AV = 1 , yes = 1 ) .0204
(.0333)
Observations 1,961
Probability of using a tax representative in filing a formal appeal
Table 17
Notes: Reported coefficients are marginal effects (i.e., the change in the probability for an 
infinitesimally small change in a continuous variable and the discrete change in the 
probability for a dummy variable). Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
 
 
  
Direct Indirect Total
Neighborhood Type
     Low Income, Majority Black .0023 -.0235*** -.0213
(.0434) (.0085) (.0172)
     High Income, Majority Black -.1074 -.0690*** -.1764**
(.1152) (.0228) (.0838)
     Low Income, Majority Hispanic -.0133 -.0226*** -.0359**
(.0340) (.0067) (.0177)
     High Income, Majority Hispanic -.0499 -.0147*** -.0646***
(.0308) (.0057) (.0245)
     Low Income, Majority White -.1970** -.0153 -.2123**
(.0882) (.0158) (.0894)
     Low Income, Racially Mixed .0557 -.0058 .0499
(.0562) (.0097) (.0794)
     High Income, Racially Mixed -.1483*** -.0226** -.1709***
(.0529) (.0529) (.0515)
** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Accounting for effects
Table 18
Probability of winning a formal appeal
Notes: Reported coefficients are marginal effects from a non-linear combination of partial derivatives 
from seemingly unrelated regressions (i.e., the change in the probability for an infinitesimally small 
change in a continuous variable and the discrete change in the probability for a dummy variable).  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
 Informal Informal
Estimated Predicted dP(I) dP(A) dP(F|A) Reduction Appeal Win
Neighborhood Type
     Low Income, Majority Black -0.0089 -0.0172 -0.0084 -0.0167 -0.0213 48.63% 48.40% 2.97%
     High Income, Majority Black -0.0100 -0.0215 -0.0101 -0.0146 -0.1764 46.42% 33.87% 19.71%
     Low Income, Majority Hispanic -0.0094 -0.0164 -0.0103 -0.0105 -0.0359 61.59% 32.98% 5.43%
     High Income, Majority Hispanic -0.0073 -0.0058 0.0005 -0.0097 -0.0646 -5.94% 71.22% 22.84%
     Low Income, Majority White -0.0046 0.0061 0.0102 0.0020 -0.2123 -61.35% -6.32% 32.33%
     Low Income, Racially Mixed -0.0061 -0.0171 -0.0126 -0.0116 0.0499 63.97% 29.85% -6.18%
     High Income, Racially Mixed -0.0066 -0.0084 0.0006 -0.0100 -0.1709 -5.25% 51.97% 42.78%
Table 19
Formal
Magnitudes of derivatives Absolute percentages
P(R) Formal
Examining the probability of reduction in assessed value by marginal effects of each component
